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Abstract The 2007 global economic crisis and
public policies implemented to resolve it have mod-
ified the conditions under which enterprises operate,
thus having great effects on business tactics and
decisions. This paper employs a comparative analysis
of the pre- and post-crisis movements of Greek small-
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to Bulgaria in
order to examine the impact of the crisis and the
applied public policy on firm-internal relocation
factors, such as size, sector and relocation incentive,
and the effects of relocation on business performance.
Greek SME movements to Bulgaria have recently
increased considerably due to the adverse effects of
the crisis on the Greek economy. Results demonstrate
that, while in the pre-crisis period many Greek
businesspeople viewed relocation to Bulgaria as an
entrepreneurial opportunity for firm expansion, since
2007 relocation has been perceived as a necessity for
the vast majority of Greek entrepreneurs in order to
stay in business. However, evidence is provided for a
clear division between businesspeople, managing
strong, and medium-sized firms and seeking business
growth and improved competitiveness, and entrepre-
neurs who own small, unproductive enterprises and
whomade efforts to maintain business without seeking
quality improvement. Consequently, many of them
failed to stay in business since they overlooked
internal to firm changes.
Keywords Economic crisis  Firm relocation 
Greece  Business performance
Mathematics Subject Classification R11 
R12  R30  M11
Introduction
Firm relocation decisions are made within diverse
socio-economic frameworks and are affected by
factors which are both internal and external to the
firm (Brouwer et al. 2004; Labrianidis 2008; Aspelund
and Butsko 2010). In economic geography literature, it
is widely accepted that operational cost reduction,
market expansion and technological improvement
constitute the main relocation incentives (Doman´ski
2003; Kiss 2007; Smallbone et al. 2012). In this
analysis, firm relocation is usually perceived by
businesspeople as an entrepreneurial opportunity for
higher profits, although several entrepreneurs move
their firms attempting to stay in business in cases of
economic recession in specific places and economic
sectors (Karagianni and Labrianidis 2001; Zahra and
George 2002; Alberti 2006; Wright et al. 2007). In
turn, the change of location affects the economic
performance of enterprises, with several scholars
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emphasizing the significance of changes that are both
internal and external to the firm to business compet-
itiveness (Krugman 1996; Bristow 2005; Sammarra
and Belussi 2006). These insights refer to conditions
of economic growth at the macro level, from the late-
1970s to late-2000s, when annual global GDP growth
was always positive (Castells 1996). However, the
2007 global economic crisis (GEC) has significantly
affected the business conditions in many territories.
While the impact of the crisis on business growth and
firm registration has been examined (Duchin et al.
2010; Claessens et al. 2012; Godart et al. 2012), the
changes in business conditions encourage a close
assessment of the crisis’ effects on firm relocation, its
internal factors, and its drivers.
The research aim of this paper is to examine the
impacts of the GEC on firm-internal factors of
business mobility and the effects of relocation on
business performance. While other studies have
examined relocation in two distinct periods of eco-
nomic growth (Bitzenis 2006; Liao and Chan 2009),
this manuscript presents the first-ever study that
compares pre- and post-crisis business movements.
Therefore, it contributes to the literature of business
mobility (van Dijk and Pellenbarg 2000; Doman´ski
2003; Brouwer et al. 2004; Kiss 2007; Wright et al.
2007; Smallbone et al. 2012) by deepening our
understanding about the effects of the crisis on firm
relocation. Moreover, this paper analyzes the effects
of relocation on business performance, by examining
the impact of aspects that are both internal and
external to the firm. Most studies have examined this
impact under conditions of economic growth (Oerle-
mans et al. 2001; Sammarra and Belussi 2006; Giner
et al. 2017). On these grounds, this article seeks to
expand our understanding of the complex relationship
between firm internal and external factors and its
impact on business competitiveness in the context of
economic decline.
Particularly, heeding the call of Morkut _e and
Koster (2016) for using long time series to understand
the effects of the GEC on business mobility, this paper
seeks to answer three research questions. First, what is
the impact of the crisis on the relocated firms in terms
of size, location, sector, and re-organized business
structure? Second, how does the crisis affect the wider
firm relocation incentives? Third, what is the impact of
relocation on the performance of firms that have
moved?
To achieve the research aims, this paper focuses on
Greece. In the geographically uneven impact of the
GEC (Wo´jcik 2009), Greece has been significantly
affected, being the only developed national economy
since the end of World War II that recorded economic
recession for six consecutive years (2008–2013) and
losing 25% of its GDP (Eurostat data). The country has
been severely affected by the crisis due to its
disadvantageous positioning within the global division
of labor, its weak productive structure and institutions,
and the government austerity policies implemented to
resolve the crisis. On these grounds, Greek small- and
medium-sized enterprises1 have been adversely
affected. On one hand, they are small, credit-depen-
dent, and family firms, and their owners ignore
technological upgrade and long-term business strategy
(Liargovas 1998; Papagiannakis 2008). On the other
hand, they constitute the backbone of the Greek
economy as they crucially contribute to employment
(87% of private sector employees in 2009) and
production (73% of total value added in 2009)
(Eurostat). Therefore, Greece could be perceived as
an archipelago of micro and small firms, as the 99.9%
of all Greek enterprises are of small and medium size.
Against the background of great economic decline,
thousands of Greek entrepreneurs have moved their
firms to Bulgaria since 2007: almost 1000 Greek firms
were operating in Bulgaria in 2006, while their
number has increased to 3000 in 2014. This phe-
nomenon is not unique within Europe. Relocation of
economic activity has also been observed recently in
other EU countries: Italian firms have moved to
Romania and transnational corporations (TNCs) have
relocated from Ireland in the first few years after 2007
(Godart et al. 2012; Valdemarin 2015). However, the
recent industrial capital flight from Greece is unprece-
dented at the European level, as since 2007 more than
10,000 firms out of the 835,000 Greek small- and
medium-sized enterprises (1.2%) have moved from
the country, mainly towards Bulgaria, according to
estimations of the HellenicMinistry of Foreign Affairs
(2017). Firm relocation from Greece to Bulgaria
started in 1989 with the end of the previous regime and
the transition of Bulgaria towards a free market
economy (Labrianidis 1997). In the context of
1 Enterprises that employ up to 250 employees and have an
annual turnover of less than €50 million (European Commission
2003).
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economic growth for Greece (3.9% annual average
growth rate from 1996 to 2007, according to Eurostat),
most businesspeople saw an opportunity to relocate to
Bulgaria, seeking market expansion and reduction of
operational cost (Bitzenis 2006). To the contrary,
other entrepreneurs, mainly the owners of clothing
firms, particularly in Northern Greece, moved to cope
with competitive pressures and avoid business failure
(Karagianni and Labrianidis 2001). However, the
socio-economic conditions have dramatically changed
since 2007, thus calling for a re-examination of firm
relocation.
The next section reviews the literature concerning
firmmobility, focusing on the wider incentives and the
impact of relocation on business performance. The
third section explains the research methodology
employed to conduct this research. The following
section analyzes the research outcomes, focusing on
identifying the main features of firms, such as size,
sector, and location, that moved under conditions of
economic growth and economic decline. It also
examines the effects of the GEC on firm relocation
incentives and the impact of relocation on business
performance, while also studies the diverse business
tactics of Greek entrepreneurs in Bulgaria. In the last
section, the conclusions and policy implications are
discussed, the limitations of this study are explained
and the suggestions for future research directions are
framed.
Firm-internal relocation factors and the effects
of relocation on business performance
The way that Kiss (2007) has conceptualized firm
relocation is particularly suitable for this paper since it
focuses on the spatial movement of firms and migra-
tion of entrepreneurs rather than foreign direct
investment (FDI) and affiliates. Firm relocation is
defined as the transfer of ‘‘part or all of firm production
and/or services to another place’’ (Kiss 2007, p. 47). It
differs from FDI that is related more closely to TNCs,
affiliates and managerial control than to small- and
medium-sized enterprises and firm migration (Labri-
anidis 2008). Therefore, theoretical perspectives on
firm relocation and migration, which are used syn-
onymously following van Dijk and Pellenbarg (2017),
are employed to inform this paper and shape its aims
and research questions.
This paper employs arguments of the behavioral
theoretical perspective on business mobility as it
focuses on firm-internal factors of relocation. The
behavioral approach examines the actual behavior of
businesspeople, perceiving the enterprises as agents
with limited information (Brouwer et al. 2004). It
emphasizes the decision-making process, focusing on
the individual preferences that play a major role for
relocation decisions, which are frequently sub-optimal
(Arauzo-Carod and Manjo´n-Antolı´n 2004; Meester
2004). On these grounds, the features of the enter-
prises are crucial for the decision-making procedure
related to relocation (van Dijk and Pellenbarg 2000;
Arauzo-Carod et al. 2010). Following the behavioral
theoretical perspective, the sector, the size, and the
location of an enterprise are variables strongly related
to relocation decisions (Brouwer et al. 2004; de Bok
and van Oort 2011; van Dijk and Pellenbarg 2017).
With regards to firm relocation drivers, in the
context of economic growth at the macro level, a
thorough scan of the literature has revealed that many
entrepreneurs identify an opportunity in moving their
firms to counter the fierce competition in the era of
trade liberalization (Harrington and Warf 1995; van
Dijk and Pellenbarg 2000; Zahra and George 2002;
Manjo´n-Antolı´n and Arauzo-Carod 2011; Smallbone
et al. 2012). However, some entrepreneurs have
moved in order to stay in business. This was found
in cases of economic decline affecting specific places
and economic sectors, including the firms in the
industrial district of Como, Italy, and clothing firms in
Northern Greece in the 1990s (Karagianni and Labri-
anidis 2001; Alberti 2006).
Specific elements which are related to the strategy
of the firms and determine business mobility (firm
relocation incentives) have been identified in the
literature. To begin with, most entrepreneurs move to
push down the operational cost of the firm (Hayter
1997; van Dijk and Pellenbarg 2000; Doman´ski 2003;
Liao and Chan 2009). Strategies for reducing opera-
tional cost become more important in the case of
economic decline at either the micro or macro level
(Godart et al. 2012). Therefore, among these strate-
gies, firm relocation increases in significance as an
option for cutting operational cost. Following this
strategy, businesspeople frequently move to regions
proximate to the home location in order to maintain
relations with existing partners and customers (Kara-
gianni and Labrianidis 2001; Kalafsky 2017). Apart
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from complete relocation, Harrington andWarf (1995)
and Wilkinson et al. (2001) have indicated that
businesspeople usually move just one part of the firm,
predominantly the production, to take advantage of the
lower labor cost in the destination territory. Second,
market and thus, business expansion constitutes
another significant incentive for corporate mobility,
as firms must grow in order to improve their perfor-
mance (Kalantaridis et al. 2011; Carrincazeaux and
Coris 2015). Third, businesspeople relocate to
enhance the competitiveness of their firms (Labrian-
idis 2008; Smallbone et al. 2012; Zhu and He 2014).
This is of primary importance in the context of the
European market integration, which has resulted in
more competitive markets (Karagianni and Labrian-
idis 2001). Apart from relocation, businesspeople
could proceed with other major external restructurings
in the context of globalization, such as mergers and
acquisitions, in order to improve business perfor-
mance (Warf 2003; Liao and Chan 2009). Finally,
scholars have drawn attention to the upgrade of the
technological base and product quality (Castells 1996;
Kiss 2007). Entrepreneurs aiming at improving the
technology of their firms often relocate close to
regions with high-skilled labor or areas that are
proximate to technological centers.
Overall, businesspeople choose the location of the
firm or relocate seeking to derive benefits from their
enterprises’ competitive advantage (Harrington and
Warf 1995; Aspelund and Butsko 2010; van Dijk and
Pellenbarg 2017). By changing the location of the
firm, several entrepreneurs respond to the changes of
the business environment, seeking to improve its
economic performance and level of innovation based
on the integration into higher value-added market
networks (Sammarra and Belussi 2006; Giner et al.
2017). The also seek to take advantage of the
proximity with innovative firms and technological
centers and new collaborative corporate systems
(Oerlemans et al. 2001). This is related to the
determinants of business competitiveness: whether
external elements of the company’s functioning are
causal factors (Porter 1990) or internal elements
should also be considered (Krugman 1996; Bristow
2005). Finally, entrepreneurs make different decisions
considering that economic practices greatly vary
across space. This variation depends on the geograph-
ically-specific economic and institutional context, the
internal features of the firms, such as the size, and the
characteristics of the entrepreneur (Hudson 2002).
While all these findings refer to the context of
global economic growth, it should be considered that
business conditions record crucial changes in the
aftermath of economic crises. Specifically, the 2007
global economic crisis has significantly affected the
performance of firms and has implied major economic
changes (Claessens et al. 2012; Godart et al. 2012). On
these grounds, this paper examining firm relocation in
the aftermath of the GEC, also employs a political
economy approach for three reasons. First, this
perspective connects the spatial movement of compa-
nies with the economic system, its transformations,
and its wider processes, such as the crisis (Gertler
2000; Harvey 2006). Second, it examines business
mobility through the lens of the broader socio-
economic context (Hudson 2002). Finally, this
approach considers firm relocation as a dynamic
practice, subject to changes caused by underlying
forces, such as globalization (Maskell and Malmberg
1999).
Therefore, the works of Harvey (2006) and Hudson
(2002) on firm mobility are specifically useful for this
paper since they focus on movements of enterprises
under conditions of economic recession. Under such
circumstances, corporate mobility is among the solu-
tions for entrepreneurs to break free of economic
decline by relocating from the territories most acutely
affected by the crisis (Hudson 2002). That is,
businesspeople seek a ‘‘spatial fix’’ for resolving the
crisis (Harvey 2006). They look for locations where
the external to the firm socio-economic environment
would allow them to restore firm performance and
increase the profit rate, taking advantage of the
geographical differentiation of socio-economic envi-
ronment, which includes several interconnected ele-
ments (Hudson 2002; Harvey 2006). Among them,
labor and transportation cost and taxation are gener-
ally perceived as the most important factors that affect
business mobility (Hayter 1997; van Dijk and Pellen-
barg 2000; Doman´ski 2003).
The theoretical framework, based on the combina-
tion of the behavioral perspective with a political
economy approach, provides the opportunity to extend
our understanding on the effects of the GEC on firm-
internal relocation factors and the impact of relocation
on business performance, which are the main research
goals of this paper. First, it aims at shedding light on
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the impact of the crisis on firm size, sector, location,
and re-organized structure, which have been high-
lighted as important firm-internal factors of business
mobility (Brouwer et al. 2004; van Dijk and Pellen-
barg 2017). Second, it attempts to analyze how the
crisis has affected the incentives for firm relocation,
which are expected to change as business mobility is
subject to transformations caused by wider underlying
processes, such as globalization and economic decline
(Maskell and Malmberg 1999; Hudson 2002). Finally,
it seeks to understand the impact of relocation on
business performance in the aftermath of the GEC,
which is anticipated to be significant (Porter 1990;
Bristow 2005).
Survey design
Sampling method and data collection
Responding to the calls of Brouwer et al. (2004,
p. 345) for ‘‘qualitative research, based on question-
naire and interviews with the actors involved in the
relocation process’’, a single case study approach
based on qualitative research method was chosen. The
single case study research strategy was chosen as it
facilitates an in-depth analysis of emerging socio-
economic phenomena (Bryman 2012). This perspec-
tive is also suitable to investigate causal processes
(Yin 2014).
Access to data on Greek firms in Bulgaria is
extremely difficult since there is no official database of
Greek enterprises in the neighboring country, while
businesspeople in Bulgaria are not obliged to register
their firms with chambers of industry and commerce.
The research population includes all the Greek small-
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) registered in
Bulgaria in 2014. There are an estimated 14,000 Greek
SMEs in Bulgaria, according to the Bulgarian Com-
mercial Register (2018). The author approached
businesspeople who had moved their firms from
Greece to Bulgaria between 1989 and 2006, during
Bulgaria’s transition towards a free market economy
(pre-crisis period), and from 2007, the beginning of
the crisis, to 2014, the year that the study was
conducted (post-crisis period). Therefore, the initial
and basic question was related to the year of reloca-
tion. These are the geographical (Bulgaria) and
temporal (the period before and after the crisis)
boundaries or features of the population.
Considering that this population includes firms that
have relocated in two distinct periods which are
related to very different socio-economic conditions,
the data for the pre-crisis SME relocation could not be
aggregated with the post-crisis business movements.
Furthermore, it is considered that, apart from the
external conditions, the type of relocated firms is also
differentiated. Therefore, the potential for systematic
bias in the types of firms which moved before and after
the crisis is recognized. On balance, the population
consists of two different subsets of analysis: the firms
that moved to Bulgaria before 2007 and the enterprises
that relocated after 2007.
Access to the Bulgarian Commercial Register
database was not possible, due to financial restrictions.
Ciela, a Bulgarian business software company, pro-
vided the author with a list of 11,500 Greek firms in
Bulgaria as of the beginning of 2014. Nevertheless,
there were no details for 3500 of the enterprises, while
around 6000 firms in groups of 200 had the same
details: the ones of their tax accounting company.
Most of these enterprises were inactive. Indeed,
several thousand Greek firms that have been recently
established in Bulgaria were found to remain inactive
for reasons of tax avoidance, mainly by conducting
triangular transactions. Terra and Kajus (2011) have
elaborated on triangular transactions: a firm is sub-
jected to the tax regime of the country in which it is
registered, regardless of whether it is actually operat-
ing there. Overall, only 1500 firms had sufficient data,
of which only 600 provided a valid email address.
These firms were included in the initial sample frame.
According to Ciela’s officials, the enterprises of the
list are included in the population of Greek firms in
Bulgaria, as laid out in the Bulgarian Commercial
Register database.
The present explanatory study draws upon original
data collected from an e-survey and fieldwork. The
e-survey was carried out in March-August 2014, by
sending the questionnaire to all 600 SMEs on the Ciela
list with a valid email address. The fieldwork was
conducted from May to June 2014. The author
attempted to locate Greek firms in the Bulgarian
towns based on the Ciela list. However, it was realized
that most addresses on the list did not correspond to
Greek firms and thus a probability sample became
impossible. Subsequently, this list was not helpful, and
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the author decided to employ multiple sampling
methods: non-probability convenience and snowball
sampling. This was done by starting the survey with
firms that were visually identified by the Greek
number plates of cars outside the premises. Before
the end of each interview session the author asked the
interviewee to name other possible respondents. The
networks of social relations that the author built with
the respondents were critical for the successful
completion of the survey. Therefore, the sample was
articulated based on the 600 firms of the Ciela list with
a valid email address and the enterprises whose
owners participated in the fieldwork survey.
In order to formulate a coherent picture of the
phenomenon, this paper combined questionnaires with
interviews. Overall, 176 closed questionnaires were
completed by owners and managers of Greek SMEs in
Bulgaria, which is a quite large sample size, consid-
ering the lack of a database. Of the 176 respondents, 73
had moved during the pre-crisis period constituting the
first subset of this sample, while the other 103
relocated in the post-crisis period, constituting the
second sampling subset. Fifty-five questionnaires
were completed in the e-survey, with a response rate
of 9%, while 121 participants replied to self-admin-
istrated questionnaires. Only 10 out of 131 business
people that were asked to participate in the survey of
self-administrated questionnaires refused. The closed
questions were related to the circumstances in Greece,
the incentive to relocate and the new conditions in
Bulgaria, alongside the size, sector, and location of the
firm. Furthermore, the respondents were asked to
evaluate the impact on relocation of the crisis and
Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union (EU), on a
Likert scale of 1 (least significant) to 5 (most
significant). The author delivered the results of the
survey to the participants in October 2015, 15 months
after the fieldwork. In order to expand the analysis and
reveal issues that were indiscernible in the question-
naires, semi-structured interviews were conducted
with 72 of the participants in the questionnaire survey,
lasting from 30 min to 1.5 h. Sixty-eight interview
respondents relocated in the post-crisis period, while
four moved before 2007. The entrepreneurs were
asked to analyze their business tactics and to describe
the drivers of relocation. In addition, four interviews
were conducted with owners and managers of tax
accounting enterprises and two with representatives of
chambers of industry and commerce in Bulgaria, since
these organizations have a high level of knowledge
regarding the performance of the Greek SMEs in
Bulgaria. Notes were kept during all the interview
sessions.
This sampling procedure provided accurate results
and was efficient for mapping a network of Greek
firms in Bulgaria, thereby highlighting significant
quantitative and qualitative aspects of this case study,
for the following reasons. First, the sampling method,
frame and characteristics were well defined (Fowler
2008). Second, Zheng et al. (2006) and Tabachnick
and Fidell (2014) have asserted that non-probability
sampling of SMEs could provide accurate results due
to great difficulties in employing a random sample.
Third, the survey was replicated to businesspeople
who own firms in all the economic sectors, at a rate
similar to the enterprises in Greece and proportional to
the Greek firms in Bulgaria (with a prevalence of trade
and services and a considerable presence of manufac-
turing). These estimates were made according to
Eurostat and unofficial data from the Greek Embassy
in Bulgaria (2014). Finally, according to the same data
from the Embassy, the geographical distribution of the
sample firms is similar to that of the Greek enterprises
in Bulgaria. All these parameters increase the accu-
racy of the research sample, considering that Greek
SMEs constitute a population of firms with quite
similar features (Liargovas 1998). Therefore, the
potential bias of the snowball sample has been
eliminated but should not be ignored in the interpre-
tation of the empirical data.
Data analysis
In processing the questionnaire data and responding to
the research questions, descriptive statistics and
comparative analysis were used. The author calculated
the frequency (%) of firm size, sector, location in
Greece and Bulgaria, firm structure that is re-orga-
nized and the incentive to relocate. Furthermore, the
frequency of each value of the Likert scale regarding
the impact of the crisis and Bulgaria’s accession to the
EU on relocation was estimated. The results of the pre-
crisis movements were compared to these of the post-
crisis period, in order to explain the direct effects of
the GEC on business mobility.
In order to deepen the analysis and provide stronger
evidence for the two first research questions, the
author investigated the relationship of the economic
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sector, location, firm structure that is re-organized,
relocation incentive, and size of the enterprises with
the period of relocation. This relationship was exam-
ined by employing the Pearson Chi square test which
is suitable to test hypotheses related to the association
between two variables (Bors 2018). Specifically, a
continuity correction test was employed and the
p value was assessed. The firms were divided into
two groups: pre- and post-crisis relocated enterprises.
Both groups had more than five observations, thus
satisfying the minimum requirement to run Chi square
analysis for reasons of statistical validity (Bors 2018).
Following Bitzenis and Marangos (2008), the results
were tested at 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance in
order to reject or accept a hypothesis, based on the
p value. Therefore, p values higher than 0.01, 0.05 and
0.1 confirm the null hypothesis (Ho) of no association
between the two variables at the respective level of
significance. By contrast, p values lower than 0.01,
0.05 and 0.1 confirm the alternative hypothesis (Ha),
according to which the two variables are associated at
the respective level of significance.
Qualitative analysis was employed to analyze
interview data, thereby comparing the research argu-
ments and theoretical propositions with the empirical
evidence (Fowler 2008). Initially, all the interviews
were manually reproduced (32 h of digital recording).
Thereon, the most relevant parts were selectively
transcribed employing the verbatim transcription
technique. In order to establish the trustworthiness of
the transcripts, the emotional context, the body
language, and the sentiments expressed by the respon-
dents were also considered (Halcomb and Davidson
2006). After combining the transcriptions with the
field notes and before finalizing the quotes, the author
checked for common themes in the manner that the
respondents self-described their business tactics, thus
systematizing and synthesizing themes from their
responses. Finally, the quotes were chosen as exam-
ples of a representative response.
Empirical analysis
Comparing business features between the pre-
and post-crisis period
A significant increase in the number of Greek firms
operating in Bulgaria has been observed since 2007.
The respondents were asked to estimate the number of
Greek firms that are active, since they have high
knowledge of the phenomenon, operating their enter-
prises and living in Bulgaria. As estimated by them, in
2006, approximately 1000 Greek firms were located in
Bulgaria, while in 2014 there were around 3000 Greek
enterprises located in the neighboring country (Kapit-
sinis 2017). Most firms in both periods were SMEs,
according to the representatives of the chambers of
industry and commerce. While there was an equal
distribution of firm size in the pre-crisis period, since
2007 micro firms have been dominant (Table 1),
emphasizing the importance of firm size in relocation
decisions (Brouwer et al. 2004; van Dijk and Pellen-
barg 2017). Indeed, the Greek micro enterprises have
been greatly influenced by the crisis (Dimitropoulou
et al. 2014), and thus their owners recorded a higher
tendency for relocation. The p value in the Chi square
analysis confirms this evidence since it is lower than
0.01. Thus, the Ha hypothesis is accepted, and firm
size is associated with the period of relocation at 1%
level of significance. While the small size of an
enterprise, and the subsequent limited resources,
constrain its ability to internationalize (Aspelund and
Butsko 2010; de Bok and van Oort 2011), the
statistical analysis reveals a high tendency of small
firms to relocate to a foreign country, due to the impact
of the recession on their performance.
Interesting results were found with respect to the
geographical distribution of the firms. In the pre-crisis
period, the vast majority of entrepreneurs (80%)
relocated from the Greek border or near-border
regions such as Thessaloniki, Serres and Drama,
taking advantage of the geographical proximity of
these areas to Bulgaria (Fig. 1). Accordingly, the
majority of the Greek SMEs relocated to the border
region of Blagoevgrad (Fig. 2) and, specifically, to the
towns of Petrich, Sandanski and Blagoevgrad and the
villages of Melnik and Marikostinovo. A smaller
number relocated to the capital region of Sofia, which
offers the biggest market and the highest quality
infrastructure (Karafotakis 1999). Similar results have
been provided by Karagianni and Labrianidis (2001)
on Greek firm relocation to Bulgaria in the 1990s.
By contrast, during the post-crisis period, the
phenomenon has spread throughout Greece. A feature
that might strike the reader is that the rate of
enterprises leaving the border regions has declined to
64% (- 20%) of the firms relocated after 2007, while
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the number of firms moving from the Attiki capital
region has considerably increased, as this region has
been greatly affected by the crisis (Giannitsis 2013).
Additionally, several enterprises have left regions of
the Greek mainland (for instance Achaia, Arta and
Fthiotida), highlighting the escalation of the phe-
nomenon and the impact of the crisis on all Greek
regions. In Bulgaria, most Greek SMEs were still
located in Blagoevgrad and Sofia regions. However,
the Chi square analysis did not confirm the Ha
hypothesis, since the p value is higher than 0.1 (0.31
for location in Greece and 0.74 for location in
Bulgaria). Consequently, the null hypothesis is
accepted, and the location of firms in Greece and
Bulgaria is not associated with the period of reloca-
tion. In other words, the Chi square analysis indicates
that the entrepreneurs have moved mainly from the
Greek border areas in both periods, taking advantage
of the geographical proximity that would allow them
to remain close to existing partners and customers and
export to proximate markets (Karagianni and Labri-
anidis 2001; Kalafsky 2017).
Table 3 indicates the economic sector of the firms
surveyed, revealing major differences between the
pre- and post-crisis period. From a statistical perspec-
tive, the p value is 0.0001 and thus lower than 0.01
(Table 2). Therefore, the Ha hypothesis is accepted,
meaning that the period of relocation and the firm
sector are interrelated at 1% level of significance.
Before 2007, manufacturing firms were the most
common, followed by trade enterprises. As expected,
among manufacturing enterprises, clothing firms were
dominant. Indeed, Karagianni and Labrianidis (2001)
have underlined the big exodus of most clothing firms
Table 1 Size of surveyed enterprises. Comparison between pre- and post-crisis period. Source: Own survey data
Number of employees Annual turnover
B 9 (micro
firms)
10–49 (small
firms)
50–249 (medium
firms)
Sample size
(N)
\€10million €10-
50million
Sample size
(N)
Pre-crisis 24 25 24 73 70 3 73
Pre-crisis
(%)
32.88 34.24 32.88 95.89 4.11
Post-crisis 68 25 10 103 95 8 103
Post-crisis
(%)
66.02 24.27 9.71 92.23 7.77
Fig. 1 Firm location in
Greece. Comparison
between the pre- and post-
crisis period. Source: Own
survey data
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from Northern Greece to the Balkan economies in the
1990s, on the grounds of the significant increase of the
competitive pressures. In the post-crisis period, a more
equal distribution of the SMEs across the economic
activities was recorded, as the crisis has affected all
economic sectors (Giannitsis 2013). First, the Greek
clothing sector, and thus manufacturing, in Bulgaria
has shrunk. According to the representatives of the
chambers of industry and commerce in Bulgaria, many
manufacturers had already relocated to more prof-
itable territories, especially to Asian emerging econo-
mies, forming part of the wider European business
movements to these countries, which increased during
the 2000s (Pickles and Smith 2011). Second, the
proportion of firms engaged in construction and
tertiary sectors (trade, mainly in clothes and food, as
well as accommodation and food service activities)
has significantly increased. In fact, the crisis has
affected all sectors in Greece (Giannitsis 2013), thus
driving the owners of the companies to seek for a
spatial fix by moving to Bulgaria, as indicated by the
statistical analysis. Particularly, enterprises in the
tertiary sector represent the 63% of the sample firms
which moved after 2007. The high rate of firms in the
tertiary sector is a similar picture to the Bulgarian
economy: almost 80% of the Bulgarian firms are
active in the tertiary sector (Eurostat data). This
evidence shows that the firms moving from Greece are
active in sectors that directly compete with local
Bulgarian firms. This claim is supported by the fact
that 45% of enterprises which moved in the aftermath
of the GEC address solely the Bulgarian market and
are not engaged with export activity. Overall, the
results of Table 3 emphasize the importance of firm
sector in relocation decisions, which have been found
to be closely associated (van Dijk and Pellenbarg
2000; Arauzo-Carod and Manjo´n-Antolı´n 2004).
Furthermore, the research findings demonstrate a
crucial transformation of business activities along
with the relocation in the post-crisis period, with many
Fig. 2 Firm location in
Bulgaria. Comparison
between the pre- and post-
crisis period. Source: Own
survey data
Table 2 Relationships of
period of relocation with
aspects of relocated firms
(Chi square test). Source:
Own survey data
Chi square statistic ( x2) Degrees of freedom p value
Size (number of employees) 22.344 2 0.0000
Location in Greece 1.032 1 0.3098
Location in Bulgaria 0.600 2 0.7408
Sector 18.869 2 0.0001
Firm structure that is re-organized 4.482 3 0.2139
Firm relocation incentive 7.533 2 0.0231
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businesspeople switching to accommodation and food
service activities. Particularly, respondents perceived
the strong presence of Greek entrepreneurs and
students in Bulgaria as an opportunity to provide food
services to them. When asked about the decision to
relocate to Petrich in 2014, the owner of a food service
enterprise said: ‘‘I opened my tavern here as there are
many Greek people. In Greece, I owned an automobile
repair store.’’ Setting up a food service firm does not
require a significant amount of seed capital, is not a
risky investment and, thus, is quite popular among
Greek businesspeople. The decisions behind these
changes are opportunistic and not well-planned,
indicating short-termism, a basic characteristic of the
Greek entrepreneurial mentality (Caloghirou 2008;
Giannitsis 2008). Overall, many Greek businesspeople
focus on speculative activities with cheap and low-
tech products and cut-rate services with low business
risk, neglecting long-term and sound business strat-
egy, while seeking to make quick and easy profits
(Papagiannakis 2008).
Accordingly, this sectoral change has also affected
the firm structure that is re-organized (Fig. 3). That is,
many entrepreneurs, having closed their firm in
Greece, established a new one in a different economic
sector in Bulgaria, in the post-crisis context. These
interviewees, when asked to provide details about the
firm structure that is re-organized, were among those
who chose the response ‘‘None of these. My firm was
always Bulgarian’’. Therefore, most of the business-
people included in this category have treated the
change of the branch of the firm or the name of the
enterprise not as relocation, but as the establishment of
a new firm. The results were estimated by accounting
for these businesspeople, as the number of respondents
who were engaged in business activity for the first time
in Bulgaria, also included in this category, was
limited.
Overall, most entrepreneurs moved the whole
enterprise, ceasing operations in Greece and setting
up a new firm in Bulgaria, in both the pre- and post-
crisis periods. Indeed, the Chi square analysis sup-
ported this result, thus rejecting the Ha hypothesis, as
the p value (0.21) is higher than 0.1. Therefore, the
firm structure that is re-organized is not associated
with the period of relocation and the crisis has not
affected the specific kind of relocation. The statistical
analysis highlights that, in both periods, the business-
people chose complete relocation to solve their
problems caused by the business conditions in Greece
that have never been favorable. Indeed, Greece
historically demonstrates ineffective state policies
and tax system, high levels of rent-seeking, corruption
and clientelism and fragile social trust (Caloghirou
2008; Papagiannakis 2008). These conditions have
further deteriorated since 2007 due to the GEC and the
austerity policies that the Greek government imple-
mented (Giannitsis 2013).
The analysis demonstrates that 18% of the respon-
dents who relocated in the pre-crisis period, moved
just one part of their firm, primarily the production
branch, in order to benefit from the low labor cost in
Bulgaria. In fact, labor cost is widely recognized as the
most important relocation factor, since it considerably
affects the total operational cost of an enterprise (van
Dijk and Pellenbarg 2000; Doman´ski 2003; Sammarra
and Belussi 2006; Kiss 2007; Zhu and He 2013).
Providing similar evidence, Karagianni and
Table 3 Sector of surveyed enterprises. Comparison between pre- and post-crisis period. Source: Own survey data
Economic sector Pre-crisis Pre-crisis (%) Post-crisis Post-crisis (%)
Primary sector 2 2.74 4 3.88
Manufacturing 34 46.58 16 15.53
Construction 4 5.48 12 11.65
Wholesale and retail trade 16 21.92 30 29.13
Accommodation and food service activities 2 2.74 17 16.50
Other service activities 11 15.06 18 17.48
Other 4 5.48 6 5.83
Sample size (N) 73 103
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Labrianidis (2001) have shown that approximately
40% of Greek enterprises in Bulgaria were involved in
partial relocation seeking to cope with the rise of
competitive pressures in the 1990s, similar to other
firms (Smallbone et al. 2012; Zhu and He 2014).
However, the socio-economic environment in
Greece has significantly deteriorated since 2007.
Contrary to the pre-crisis period evidence and sug-
gestions in the literature (Wilkinson et al. 2001;
Smallbone et al. 2012), the tendency for partial
relocation has declined by 50% (just 9% of the
respondents who moved after 2007). That is, the
entrepreneurs did not favor any business activity, even
just the operation of a managerial branch, within the
hazardous conditions in Greece.When asked about the
decision to relocate to Blagoevgrad in 2010, a
respondent explained: ‘‘I could not make it in Greece.
Why continue having even part of my enterprise
there?’’ Moreover, a small number of subsidiaries
(10%) was found in the post-crisis period. The very
small size and low level of financial resources of the
Greek SMEs were important for the decision to
relocate rather than to set up an affiliate. Considering
that firm size and relocation decisions are closely
interrelated (Aspelund and Butsko 2010; de Bok and
van Oort 2011), it is worth noting that the small size
and the subsequent low level of financial resources of
the Greek SMEs were important for the decision to
relocate rather than to set up an affiliate.
Businesspeople’s limited ability to be both in Greece
and Bulgaria to manage the enterprise was
determinant.
Finally, the findings indicate that many business-
people who moved in the post-crisis period (37%)
have established a firm in Bulgaria without closing
their enterprise in Greece. This is considered a firm
expansion, albeit not the typical kind, on the basis that
the firm in Greece was often inactive. The respondents
made the decision not to close the enterprise in Greece
to facilitate exports and pay off any possible debt. This
was clearly the case for an interviewee who estab-
lished a trading firm in Sofia in 2010 and stated: ‘‘I was
obliged to keep my firm in Greece in an inactive mode,
to pay off my debts.’’ Additionally, some entrepre-
neurs maintained their firm in Greece because firm
closure procedures are time-consuming, especially in
the case of large debts to the government or the banks.
By contrast, during the pre-crisis period, businesspeo-
ple expanded their firms to Bulgaria, mainly in the
banking and food industries, to boost business growth,
in the wider context of economic optimism (Kara-
gianni and Labrianidis 2001; Bitzenis 2006).
The impact of the crisis on relocation incentives:
business growth versus survival
Half of the respondents that moved between 1989 and
2006 were seeking market expansion and lower
operational cost (Fig. 4), which have been indicated
Fig. 3 Firm structure that is
re-organized. Comparison
between the pre- and post-
crisis period. Source: Own
survey data
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as important relocation incentives (van Dijk and
Pellenbarg 2000; Doman´ski 2003; Liao and Chan
2009; Smallbone et al. 2012). They perceived reloca-
tion as an opportunity for higher profits and firm
expansion. These respondents owned firms primarily
in trade and construction. The work of Labrianidis
(1997) is helpful in understanding that relocation was
only part of wider restructurings, which Greek
entrepreneurs adopted to boost firm competitiveness.
Other strategies were related to labor cost reduction,
mergers, and buyouts. The opening of the Balkan
economies and the low degree of penetration of
Western European TNCs created an environment that
was identified by Karagianni and Labrianidis (2001) as
an opportunity for Greek businesspeople to expand
their markets to the neighboring country. This research
outcome concurs with findings in the literature related
to other cases, including German firm relocation to
Central Europe and movements of Japanese electron-
ics firms to Malaysia (Pavlı´nek and Smith 1998;
Wilkinson et al. 2001; Manjo´n-Antolı´n and Arauzo-
Carod 2011). When asked about the decision to enter
the Bulgarian market, a respondent who has been
running a firm in Melnik since 2004 emphatically
noted: ‘‘It was my choice to invest in Bulgaria. It was
an opportunity to expand the markets of my
enterprise.’’
Looking at Fig. 4, one is especially struck by the
fact that the remaining half of the respondents who
relocated before 2007 were found to be striving for
firm survival. This research outcome confirms that the
business environment in Greece has never been
favorable, owing to the inferior position of Greece in
the global division of labor and Greece’s weak
institutions (Caloghirou 2008; Giannitsis 2008). Nev-
ertheless, given the conditions of economic growth at
the macro level in Greece during that period, it was far
from expected that so many entrepreneurs would have
moved their firms in order to stay in business. Most
respondents who relocated to Bulgaria before 2007 to
avoid business failure owned manufacturing firms
(64%). Providing similar results, Karagianni and
Labrianidis (2001) have indicated that in the clothing
sector, firm survival constituted the main incentive for
relocation from Greece to Bulgaria in the 1990s.
Tending to base their products’ competitiveness on
price, these firms’ owners experienced strong compe-
tition from the EU Core as well as emerging
economies because of the European economic inte-
gration and trade liberalization in the late-1980s
(Labrianidis 1997). At that time, subsidies and grants
for exports, restrictions, and duties on imports from
developing countries and therefore, protectionism of
the Greek economy were abolished. The commodities
produced by the Greek firms could compete neither
with those of the developed economies in terms of
quality, nor with those of the developing economies in
terms of price. Subsequently, entrepreneurs found a
way to break free of economic decline by moving,
often partially, their firm or subcontracting enterprises
Fig. 4 Firm relocation
incentive. Comparison
between the pre- and post-
crisis period. Source: Own
survey data
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in Bulgaria, seeking operational cost reduction that
was vital for firm survival (Karagianni and Labrianidis
2001). Providing similar evidence, Alberti (2006) has
indicated that firm exit from the industrial cluster of
Como in the late-1990s was a necessity, as the specific
area recorded rapid economic recession.
The conditions in Greece have significantly chan-
ged since 2007. Considering that the wider socio-
economic context under which firms operate has
significant effects on firm mobility (Hudson 2002;
Harvey 2006), it could be argued that the escalation of
the phenomenon of relocation fromGreece to Bulgaria
is largely attributed to the severe impact of the GEC
and the way that the Greek government attempted to
resolve it. In 2010, Greece was excluded from the
international financial capital markets and the gov-
ernment decided to implement stringent austerity
policies to achieve fiscal balance. Landmark measures
involved a rise in taxation (an increase of business tax
rate from 20% in 2011 to 26% and implementation of
exceptional taxes), cuts in wages and pensions (25%
reduction of labor cost, the greatest in the EU from
2010 to 2013), and the abolition of collective agree-
ments. These policies formed part of a rescue plan
under the directives of the European Central Bank, the
European Commission, and the International Mone-
tary Fund, while another similar plan was agreed upon
in 2012 (Kapitsinis et al. 2013).
The crisis and austerity policies have entailed
higher taxation, a lack of external financing, a drop in
demand, and a collapse of trust within Greek society,
which in turn, have deepened the economic decline
(Giannitsis 2013). All these circumstances have made
the Greek socio-economic environment quite haz-
ardous for SMEs. Considering in addition their low
competitiveness and family character (Liargovas
1998), the impact on Greek SMEs was bound to be
important. The operational cost rose, and revenues
fell, while credit was not extended. Subsequently,
SMEs were in a strenuous position with massive debt
(€193 billion or 93% of GDP) and drop in profits, thus
recording high bankruptcy risk. In the context of the
crisis, the number of Greek SMEs declined by 25%
(228,000 fewer firms) from 2008 to 2014 (Ministry of
Finance 2017), while other businesspeople decided to
move from Greece.
The crisis and government policies have driven the
decision of most respondents (86%) to relocate to
Bulgaria after 2007. The economic downturn and the
vicious cycle of austerity had significantly affected
firm operation, as capital could not be circulated
profitably. Businesspeople did not favor the socio-
economic conditions in Greece and reacted against
falling profits by moving to Bulgaria in order to avoid
economic decline and firm bankruptcy. Research
outcomes demonstrate that most respondents (67%)
would not have relocated from Greece if the crisis had
not occurred. When asked about the decision to move
to Bulgaria, a respondent in Petrich stated: ‘‘I would
have no reason to relocate if the crisis had not occurred
and the Greek government had not implemented these
policies.’’
Therefore, contrary to the balanced picture of the
pre-crisis period, the primary relocation incentive for
71% of the surveyed entrepreneurs who moved after
2007 was to keep their business going and secondly, to
turn it around (Fig. 4). From a statistical point of view,
the p value is 0.02 and thus lower than 0.05. As such,
the Ha hypothesis is accepted, meaning that the period
of relocation and firm relocation incentive are inter-
related at 5% level of significance. In other words, the
Chi square analysis confirms that the GEC has affected
the wider firm relocation incentive. Greek business-
people sought a spatial fix for escaping from the Greek
post-crisis economic and institutional environment
and restoring profits. In describing the spatial fix,
Harvey (2006) and Hudson (2002) have argued that
space is essential in businesspeople’s efforts to avoid
economic decline and increase the falling profit rate.
The manager of a tax accounting company in Petrich
said: ‘‘since 2007, Greek entrepreneurs have been
moving to Bulgaria to survive and restore profits.’’ The
owner of a construction enterprise in Blagoevgrad
added: ‘‘I moved to Bulgaria to escape from decline,
keep my firm running and increase my profits.’’
Despite businesspeople’s efforts to resolve the
crisis by reducing operational cost, most frequently
through dismissals and labor flexibilization, business
performance had not improved since conditions dete-
riorated as time passed, thus making external restruc-
turings, such as relocation, necessary. Relocation
emerged as a necessity to stay in business by
drastically pushing down the operational cost in
Bulgaria. The manager of a manufacturing firm in
Sofia mentioned: ‘‘we were obliged to relocate and
change lifestyles to maintain business and start
improving firm performance.’’ The owner of a
construction firm in Marikostinovo added: ‘‘I was
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desperate, just seeking to keep the business running.’’
The businesspeople decided to relocate, rather than
abandoning entrepreneurship. The owner of a small
trade firm in Sofia, established in 2014, stated: ‘‘This is
what I can do, nothing else.’’ A self-employed
respondent who moved to Sandanski in 2013 added
surprisingly: ‘‘I came here to earn more money. I
prefer being a business owner in Bulgaria rather than
an employee in Greece, even with a salary of €2,500.’’
Many respondents would have had to cease operations
if they had not moved, thus perceiving relocation as a
necessity, as they faced high bankruptcy risk in the
post-crisis period. This result is crucial for economic
geography literature where the claims about opportu-
nity-driven firm mobility in the context of economic
growth flourish (Pavlı´nek and Smith 1998; Doman´ski
2003; Wright et al. 2007; Smallbone et al. 2012).
The results show that for most respondents the
decision to move from Greece in the post-crisis period
did not form part of a long-term strategy that would
focus on quality improvement. For instance, many
entrepreneurs collected rough information on Bulgar-
ia’s market quickly and extemporaneously on their
own or from asking friends. By contrast, Wilkinson
et al. (2001) and Zahra and George (2002) have
described well-planned relocation decisions within a
wider strategy of long-term investment to boost firm
competitiveness and improve product quality, in the
context of economic growth. However, within a
recessionary environment, only 29% of the respon-
dents relocated in pursuit of market expansion and
reduction of operational cost, which studies indicated
to be crucial incentives for opportunity-driven firm
relocation, under conditions of economic growth
(Kalantaridis, Vassilev, and Fallon 2011; Carrin-
cazeaux and Coris 2015). The owner of another tax
accounting company said: ‘‘a small number of
entrepreneurs have other goals, such as product
upgrade.’’
However, differences in incentives were found
among the respondents that moved in the post-crisis
period. The owners of 76% of micro and 52% of small
enterprises would not have relocated to Bulgaria if the
crisis had not occurred, as these firms have been most
acutely affected by the crisis and austerity policies
(Dimitropoulou et al. 2014). By contrast, most owners
of medium-sized firms (66%) would have moved to
Bulgaria even under conditions of economic growth.
Specifically, the owner of a medium-sized firm in
Marikostinovo explained: ‘‘It was a decision that I
planned for a long time. I would relocate to Bulgaria
anyway to test the market and the level of my sales.’’
Additionally, most entrepreneurs in manufacturing
(52%) would have relocated even if the crisis had not
occurred, while owners of trade (80%) and services
(72%) firms would not have moved to Bulgaria if
economic growth had continued, suggesting that the
Greek manufacturing sector has been slightly more
resilient than the tertiary sector in the post-crisis
period.
Differences in the relocated firms: true
entrepreneurs versus survivors
Departing from these observations, the author decided
to disaggregate the results and divide the business-
people into two distinct groups according to their
wider incentive and motivation for relocation
(Table 4). The first group involves the businesspeople
who perceived relocation as an entrepreneurial oppor-
tunity seeking economic growth and market expan-
sion. They own big, strong, and productive firms,
having moved in both the pre- and post-crisis periods,
and are called the ‘‘true entrepreneurs’’. The second
group involves the owners of small, weak, and
unproductive enterprises who perceived relocation as
a necessity to avoid business failure. This group,
which is called the ‘‘survivors’’, was dominant in the
post-crisis period (71% of all businesspeople who
have relocated since 2007 according to Fig. 4). Five
specific points are worth our attention.
First, the size of the enterprises is closely related to
the type of their owners and thus the incentive for
relocation, as firm size significantly affects relocation
decisions (Brouwer et al. 2004; de Bok and van Oort
2011). The true entrepreneurs, in both periods,
demonstrate high levels of medium firms (33% in
the pre-crisis period and 20% in the post-crisis
context), compared to the survivors (just 5%). By
contrast, the survivors own mainly micro firms (72%),
whereas only 36% (pre-crisis) and 45% (post-crisis) of
true entrepreneurs employ less than 9 people. This is
an important finding considering that 98% of the
Greek firms were micro enterprises in 2009 (Eurostat).
Second, access to credit has been necessary for the
majority (70%) of the survivors, while it has not been
necessary for over a half of the true entrepreneurs.
Most survivors (45%) have used loans to pay taxes,
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wages, and utilities, i.e. to fund their working capital,
as they mainly own micro firms (Labrianidis and
Vogiatzis 2013). By contrast, only a minor part of the
true entrepreneurs (20% -pre-crisis- and 25% -post-
crisis) have used external funds to finance their
working capital, as they manage larger and stronger
firms which are more productive than the firms of the
survivors.
Third, most survivors (54%) moved their firms to
the border region of Blagoevgrad due to geographical
proximity. Only 25% of the survivors relocated to
Sofia which has the biggest market in Bulgaria
(Karafotakis 1999). By contrast, over a half of the
true entrepreneurs moved to Sofia (51% in the pre-
crisis context and 50% in the post-crisis period), since
their stronger firms can cope with the competition.
Fourth, 72% of the survivors completely moved to
Bulgaria as they could not sustain any business
activity in Greece, while only 36% -pre-crisis- and
20% -post-crisis- of the true entrepreneurs chose the
complete relocation. Consequently, most true entre-
preneurs still own a firm in Greece, while 68% of the
survivors do not. This could be explained by the fact
that the micro firms, which are managed mainly by
survivors, were most acutely affected by the crisis and
austerity policies (Dimitropoulou et al. 2014). More-
over, this finding could possibly be a consequence of
the limited financial resources that the survivors have,
Table 4 Descriptive statistics according to the wider relocation incentive. Source: Own survey data
Employees True entrepreneurs pre-crisis
(%)
True entrepreneurs post-crisis
(%)
Survivors post-crisis
(%)
Less than 9 36.67 45.83 72.13
10–49 30 33.33 22.95
50–249 33.33 20.83 4.92
Why was external finance
necessary?
To fund the working capital 20 25 45
To proceed to investments 30 30 25
To pay off older debt 4 4 0
It was not necessary 46 41 30
Region in Bulgaria
Sofia 51.72 50.00 24.59
Blagoevgrad 37.93 33.40 54.1
Rest of the country 10.34 16.60 21.31
Firm structure that is re-organised
Complete relocation 36.67 20.83 72.13
Partial relocation 20 8.33 13.11
Expansion 20 58.33 8.2
The firm was always Bulgarian 23.33 8.33 4.92
Owning a firm in Greece
Yes 57.14 86.67 31.03
No 42.86 13.33 68.97
Is the firm a subsidiary
Yes 20 37.5 1.64
No 80 62.5 98.36
Possibility of relocation if the crisis had not unfolded True entrepreneurs post-crisis (%) Survivors post-crisis (%)
Yes 71.43 18.64
No 28.57 81.36
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as they mainly own micro enterprises (Aspelund and
Butsko 2010; de Bok and van Oort 2011). Therefore,
only 1.5% of the survivors’ firms are subsidiaries,
whereas 20% of the true entrepreneurs that relocated
in the pre-crisis period and 37% of the true
entrepreneurs who have moved since 2007 own
subsidiaries.
Finally, if the crisis had not emerged the employed
business tactics between the true entrepreneurs and the
survivors really present a great contrast. On one hand,
the vast majority of the survivors (81%) would not
have moved if the GEC had not unfolded, revealing
the necessity-driven decision for relocation. On the
other hand, 71% of the true entrepreneurs stated that
they would have moved even without the crisis, since
they perceived relocation as an entrepreneurial oppor-
tunity for market expansion and reduction of opera-
tional cost.
Overall, there are many similarities between the
types of the firms regardless of the period that they
moved. In other words, the businesspeople that own
strong and productive firms and relocated in the post-
crisis period record more similar findings with the true
entrepreneurs that moved in the pre-crisis period
rather than with the survivors who have relocated
since 2007. The latter own small and weak firms of
low productivity and competitiveness.
The socio-economic environment in Bulgaria
Apparently, most respondents moved to Bulgaria to
reduce the operational cost by taking advantage of the
different socio-economic conditions to Greece. The
Bulgarian state, which seems more business-friendly
than the Greek, has been an ‘‘active agent’’ for FDI in
the last 25 years, like most states in Central and
Eastern Europe (Hudson 2002). That is, it has been
making efforts to create suitable circumstances for
attracting foreign firms by providing incentives related
to low taxation and labor cost and high formal
institutional capacity (Slaveski and Nedanovski
2002; Bitzenis 2006). These conditions have attracted
Greek entrepreneurs in the pre-crisis period.
In the aftermath of the 2007 GEC, Greek business-
people relocated to Bulgaria because of the way the
crisis developed in the neighboring country and was
dealt by the state. Indeed, the Bulgarian economy has
been less affected by the crisis, while the government
has adopted less stringent austerity measures than the
Greek one, focusing on cuts in public expenditures,
which had no severe effects on the Bulgarian economy
(Petkov 2014). After a sharp decline in GDP in 2009
(- 3.6% GDP growth from 6% in 2007), the Bulgar-
ian economy recovered (1.3% GDP growth in 2010
and 1.9% in 2011), whereas unemployment rate
recorded a more significant impact (13% in 2013
from 6.9% in 2007), but less important than the one in
Greece (Eurostat).
Since 2007, Bulgaria has regulated the lowest
corporate tax rate (10%) and minimum wage (16% of
the EU average) in the EU, which allowed the Greek
businesspeople to greatly reduce the operational cost.
Additionally, the Bulgarian state provides electronic
governance, thus paving the way for low-cost trans-
actions with citizens. Greek entrepreneurs seem to
have coped with existing corruption in Bulgaria, since
they have had ample experience with it in Greece
(Giannitsis 2013). Consequently, the Bulgarian socio-
economic environment allowed the reduction of
operational cost, which was greater in the post-crisis
period. A relocated firm’s operational cost dropped by
40% on average before 2007, while in the post-crisis
period the decline was even greater (60%), as since the
late-2000s the Greek business environment has
become more expensive.
Finally, the relocation decision of most entrepre-
neurs (71%) was significantly affected by Bulgaria’s
accession to the EU in 2007. This was an important
development for Bulgaria, resulting in open borders
and trade liberalization with the rest EUmember states
and a partial improvement in the institutional envi-
ronment (Pashev 2011). Several scholars have indi-
cated that the accession of Central and Eastern
European states to the EU has facilitated the entry of
Western European firms into their markets (Hudson
2002; Ju¨rgens and Krzywdzinski 2009). A respondent
who runs a construction firm in Blagoevgrad said: ‘‘I
moved after 2007, as Bulgaria’s accession to the EU
was added to the very low operational cost.’’
The impact of relocation on SME performance:
the importance of business strategies
Considering the significant problems that the entre-
preneurs faced in Greece and their decision to resolve
them by relocating, it is important to examine the
implications of their tactics on firm performance and
competitiveness, especially in the post-crisis period.
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Certainly, the change of external socio-economic
conditions was crucial. The great reduction of the
operational cost, as a result of the lower labor and
transportation cost and taxation, is the most beneficial
development for most entrepreneurs surveyed (92%),
thus lessening the necessity of external finance and
boosting revenues. However, in the new Bulgarian
socio-economic context, a question arisen is related to
whether the low operational cost was sufficient to
secure SME survival. Based on the division between
true entrepreneurs and survivors (Table 4), evidence
about business tactics and performance in Bulgaria is
provided in Table 5.
Seeking to explain the diverse findings related to
firm performance after the relocation to Bulgaria, it is
worth noting the various business tactics recorded by
the different types of Greek businesspeople. Most true
entrepreneurs (50% in the pre-crisis period and 35% in
the post-crisis context) address several markets apart
from the Greek and Bulgarian ones. Indeed, many
respondents from this category sought the integration
into new market and coordination networks, attempt-
ing to export to Western Europe, despite the difficul-
ties that SMEs face for export activities (Kalafsky
2017). It is worth noting that a minor part of the true
entrepreneurs (6.67% in the pre-crisis context and
4.35% in the post-crisis period) targets solely the
Greek market. This indicates that, after the relocation
to Bulgaria, they proceeded with internal changes to
their firms, which are crucial for improving business
competitiveness (Krugman 1996; Bristow 2005; Sam-
marra and Belussi 2006).
Other important internal changes include the
development of new products, the improvement of
product quality, and the introduction of innovation.
For instance, in boosting firm competitiveness, apart
from relocation, the owner of a manufacturing enter-
prise in Sofia implemented internal changes, claiming:
‘‘Relocation affected my entrepreneurial mentality, as
in Bulgaria I trade new products of higher quality. This
was crucial to the success of the firm.’’ Moreover, an
entrepreneur who operates a trading firm in Petrich
stated: ‘‘I added services to improve the competitive-
ness of my firm, such as free shipping of products to
Greece.’’ Finally, the owner of a trading firm in
Blagoevgrad has focused on improving product qual-
ity: ‘‘I am, primarily, interested in the quality and,
secondarily, in the price of my products. In the absence
of external finance, I am much more careful in what
and how much I buy.’’
These business tactics have affected the perfor-
mance of the firms owned and managed by the true
entrepreneurs. These internal to the firm changes,
alongside the new socio-economic conditions in
Bulgaria, have led to economic recovery for these
enterprises. Considering in addition, the high produc-
tivity of these firms, it is not surprising that they record
the highest rate of performance improvement in
Bulgaria. Specifically, 33% of the true entrepreneurs
that moved in the pre-crisis period stated that they
improved the performance of their enterprises
Table 5 Firm performance in Bulgaria according to the wider relocation incentive. Source: Own survey data
True entrepreneurs pre-crisis
(%)
True entrepreneurs post-crisis
(%)
Survivors post-crisis
(%)
Target market of the company
Bulgaria 40 47.83 37.50
Greece 6.67 4.35 23.21
Other countries 26.67 8.7 0
Bulgaria and Greece 3.33 13.04 19.64
Combination of all 23.33 26.09 19.64
Improvement of firm performance in
Bulgaria
Great improvement 56.67 54.55 48.28
Partial improvement 33.33 31.82 44.83
No improvement at all 3.33 9.09 6.9
Deterioration of firm performance 6.67 4.55 0
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partially, while 56% of these businesspeople improved
it greatly. Moreover, 31% of the true entrepreneurs
that have relocated since 2007 said that they have
improved business performance partially and 54%
have improved it greatly.
By contrast, the survivors moved their firms,
primarily involved in low value-added micro-trade
activities, to Bulgaria, as a reactive decision with no
intention of making internal changes, seeking solely
firm survival rather than quality improvement. Indeed,
many respondents disconnected the decision to relo-
cate with efforts to upgrade the technology or improve
the quality of products and services, despite the fact
that businesspeople frequently relocate seeking to
upgrade the quality of goods (Castells 1996; Small-
bone et al. 2012). The lack of such plans is related to
the poor SME performance, respondents’ eagerness to
break free of the Greek post-crisis institutional and
economic environment, and the Greek entrepreneurial
mentality. Regarding the latter, most Greek business-
people lack strategic planning and neglect product
quality, circumventing occasional falling sales by
cutting costs and adopting defensive and short-term
business tactics that usually rest on tax avoidance
through clientelist relations with state officials
(Caloghirou 2008).
The survivors believed that relocation would solve
all their problems. For instance, many survivors (23%)
address only the Greek market, despite the great drop
in demand, while only 19% target a market apart from
the Greek and Bulgarian ones. This highlights that
most survivors, having low entrepreneurial skills and
expectations, typical of a Greek SME owner (Caloghi-
rou 2008), neglected the integration into new market
and coordination networks, expecting that relocation
would restore firm performance on its own. This
finding highlights that relocation has not affected their
business performance. On these grounds, they over-
looked, or were incapable to apply internal changes to
their enterprises. For instance, the owner of a food
service firm in Petrich did not manage to overcome
financial hardship by simply targeting the increasing
population of Greek entrepreneurs in Bulgaria, as
neither the latter’s support nor their long term stay in
Bulgaria should be taken for granted. Moreover, the
same entrepreneur accentuated: ‘‘I have not made
changes internal to the firm, a fact that deteriorated its
performance.’’ On these grounds, the business oper-
ations of survivors in Bulgaria are not considered
long-term. Unsurprisingly, they record the smallest
rate of entrepreneurs (48%), who improved the
economic performance of their enterprises
considerably.
As noticed in the second visit to Bulgaria,
15 months after the fieldwork, the great reduction of
operational cost allowed most sample firms (75%) to
survive. The majority of them recorded neither an
improvement nor a deterioration of their performance.
However, 25% of the firms surveyed were shut down
in Bulgaria. Most of them were managed by survivors.
This firm closure rate is much higher than the
enterprise death rate in Bulgaria (13%) in
2013–2014 (Eurostat data). These results underline
the great vulnerability of the Greek SMEs in a foreign
environment. On balance, the true entrepreneurs
combined relocation with internal changes and
achieved the fastest recovery and growth of the
enterprise, while many survivors struggle to maintain
business in Bulgaria. These findings contrast with the
arguments of Porter (1990) and back the claims of
Krugman (1996) and Bristow (2005), revealing the
complex relationship between internal and external
elements and the way it affects business competitive-
ness. While space and territorially-specific socio-
economic conditions are crucial for the performance
of the enterprise (Porter 1990), factors related to the
core of the firm are just as important (Krugman 1996;
Bristow 2005).
The moderate business performance is among the
reasons that the increased registration of Greek SMEs
to Bulgaria in the post-crisis period has not benefitted
the Bulgarian regional economies as much as
expected. Other reasons are related to the inactive
firms and to the fact that many entrepreneurs transfer
part of the value produced in Bulgaria back to Greece
to pay debts. By contrast, the negative impact on the
Greek regions has been much more important. Con-
sequently, regions in Southern Bulgaria that attracted
the largest number of Greek SMEs have recorded
among the lowest economic growth rates in the
country since 2010, according to Eurostat data. On
the other hand, the regions of Northern Greece, where
many firms used to be located, demonstrated among
the highest unemployment and recession rates in
crisis-ridden Greece.
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Conclusions
This paper has examined the relocation of Greek
SMEs to Bulgaria under conditions of economic
growth and decline at the macro level, in order to
understand the impacts of the GEC on firm-internal
factors of business mobility and the effects of reloca-
tion on business performance. Before reflecting on the
findings, it is essential to reiterate the limitation of this
paper: interviews on a limited number of SME owners
and managers were conducted, attributable to the
restricted availability of data, which is the biggest
obstacle in studying Greek firms that operate in
foreign countries. For this reason, the survey sample
was purposive and the results present limitations
regarding their generalization.
The analysis of this paper highlighted significant
differences related to firm-internal relocation factors
between the pre- and post-crisis period. In both
periods, most businesspeople moved the whole firm
from Greece to Bulgaria. However, differences
uncovered the considerable impact of the 2007 global
economic crisis on firm relocation. Indeed, a brief
overview of the findings leads to the conclusion that
the GEC and the policies implemented to resolve it
had a crucial impact on firm-internal factors of
business mobility, thus contributing to the firm
relocation literature (Doman´ski 2003; Brouwer et al.
2004; Kiss 2007; Labrianidis 2008; van Dijk and
Pellenbarg 2017).
In the pre-crisis period, there was an equal distri-
bution of the size of Greek SMEs in Bulgaria, while
most of them were active in trade and manufacturing.
Relocation was perceived as an opportunity for many
Greek entrepreneurs to expand the market and restore
competitiveness, similar to business movements in
other case studies (Pavlı´nek and Smith 1998; Wilkin-
son et al. 2001; Smallbone et al. 2012). What is of
uppermost importance is that many SME owners could
solve their problems in Greece by internal restructur-
ings, including dismissals and cuts in investments.
While before 2007, businesspeople considered
relocation necessary only in specific sectors and
regions which recorded economic decline, such as
the firms in the industrial district of Como, Italy
(Karagianni and Labrianidis 2001; Alberti 2006),
since 2007, relocation from Greece to Bulgaria was
perceived as a necessity for most entrepreneurs in all
the regions and economic sectors. The Greek SMEs in
Bulgaria were distributed more equally across the
economic sectors than in the pre-crisis period, as the
GEC has affected all economic sectors. Contrary to the
pre-crisis evidence, the micro enterprises were dom-
inant among the Greek SMEs in Bulgaria, as these
firms were mostly affected by the economic decline in
Greece. These results highlight the strong correlation
of business mobility with factors internal to the firm,
such as size, sector, and entrepreneurial strategy (van
Dijk and Pellenbarg 2000; Brouwer et al. 2004).
Most businesspeople would have had to cease
operations if they had not relocated, owing to the high
bankruptcy risk in Greece. They moved in an effort to
avoid business failure by breaking free of the Greek
business environment. The latter considerably deteri-
orated as a result of the GEC and government policies.
Indeed, businesspeople’s decision to relocate was
greatly influenced by the political choices of the Greek
government that focused on austerity measures to
achieve fiscal stability, entailing a rise in taxation, a
drop in demand, a collapse of social trust and a lack of
external finance. Greek businesspeople relocated to
Bulgaria in order to maintain business by significantly
reducing the operational cost. That is, they sought a
spatial fix for resolving the crisis (Harvey 2006).
In conclusion, the post-crisis relocation of Greek
SMEs is different to the case of the TNCs moving
around the globe, and of the strong SMEs internation-
alizing to expand their markets, in the context of
economic growth (van Dijk and Pellenbarg 2000;
Zahra and George 2002; Wright et al. 2007; Small-
bone et al. 2012). Therefore, this paper enriches the
academic discourse on business internationalization,
by highlighting the case of firm survival: many
entrepreneurs decided to internationalize to avoid
business failure, instead of closing their firms or
working as employees. The decision to relocate was
not related to the incapability to produce cheap
products or to provide low-cost services in Greece
but to the inability to pay daily operations, including
salaries and taxes.
However, apart from the changes in the business
environment, there are differences in the composition
and type of entrepreneurs. The analysis of this paper
suggested a clear division between true entrepreneurs
and survivors. In the pre-crisis context, primarily, and
the post-crisis period, secondarily, many respondents
were considered true entrepreneurs, seeking business
growth and perceiving relocation as an entrepreneurial
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opportunity for market expansion and cheaper pro-
duction. These businesspeople own strong and pro-
ductive firms and relocated to reach better profit
opportunities. Apart from the relocation decision, the
owners of these enterprises, which are mainly
medium-sized, made important internal changes, such
as development of new products, aiming at quality
upgrade. Their operations in Bulgaria appear to be
long-term, while several businesspeople reported that
they would have relocated even if the crisis had not
unfolded.
Since 2007, the Greek true entrepreneurs in
Bulgaria have declined and most businesspeople are
close to the profile of the survivor: owners of weak,
small, and unproductive firms relocating to avoid
business failure. Many entrepreneurs moved to Bul-
garia as a reactive, unconsidered decision with no
intention of making internal changes, seeking solely
firm survival, and overlooking quality improvement.
Thus, the change of firm location has not had a
considerable impact on their business performance.
This finding enriches the business mobility literature,
which refers primarily to well-planned relocation
decisions within a broader strategy of long-term
investment to boost business competitiveness (Wilkin-
son et al. 2001; Zahra and George 2002; Smallbone
et al. 2012). These survivor business tactics are related
to the main characteristics of the Greek entrepreneur-
ial mentality, including short-termism, unsound busi-
ness strategy for making quick profits and low
business expectations. Many survivors believed that
relocation would solve all their problems, while
continuing to focus on the Greek market, despite the
substantial drop in demand. Their business operations
in Bulgaria are not considered long-term.
On the other side of the border, Bulgaria provided a
socio-economic context in which entrepreneurs could
potentially sustain their business. In the neighboring
country, Greek businesspeople drastically reduced
operational cost as a result of the lowest corporate tax
rate and labor cost in the EU alongside the Bulgarian
institutions, which exhibit a modest level of develop-
ment. Therefore, many businesspeople managed to
improve the business performance, especially the true
entrepreneurs, who have long-term business plans and
proceeded with changes which are internal to the firm,
such as the integration into new market networks and
the introduction of innovation. Most survivors
neglected such business tactics. Many of them failed
in Bulgaria as they assumed relocation would solve all
their problems. However, changes internal to the firm
were essential, as they greatly influence, alongside the
external socio-economic environment, business com-
petitiveness (Krugman 1996; Bristow 2005). The
overall moderate performance of Greek SMEs in
Bulgaria has entailed a greater negative impact on the
Greek regions, where these firms used to be located,
than the positive effects on the Bulgarian regions,
where these enterprises relocated.
Turning to policy recommendations, the results
highlight the failure of the Greek government austerity
policies to provide stable business conditions. These
policies have focused on an internal devaluation
through a great reduction of labor cost which,
according to the narrative of the governors, would
attract FDI in the country. However, this has led to
deeper socio-economic inequalities (Giannitsis 2013).
Furthermore, these policies have not been effective.
Despite the great reduction of labor cost, inward FDI
has not increased (Eurostat). On the contrary, thou-
sands of businesspeople have relocated from Greece,
as their enterprises’ operations were not profitable be-
cause of the significant deterioration of the wider
economic and institutional environment. Progressive
transformations, including the upgrade of production,
the rise of wages and the improvement of institutional
capacity, are necessary for strengthening the SMEs,
which would boost employment, and for creating a
more sustainable and socially just developmental
model.
Departing from the findings and interpretations of
this paper, particular priorities for future research
agenda in economic geography are recommended. The
hypothesis that is generated and needs to be tested in
other cases is the following: owners of, mainly, weak
firms in territories that are deeply affected by the
economic crisis, like the EU peripheral economies,
perceive relocation as a necessity to avoid business
failure. For instance, the post-crisis increase of
relocation of Italian firms to Romania needs to be
further examined. Scholars could also test this hypoth-
esis in other territories which have been greatly
affected by the crisis, such as Spain and Portugal.
The broader lesson for scholars examining business
relocation and internationalization (Zahra and George
2002;Wright et al. 2007; Smallbone et al. 2012) is that
apart from the change in the external socio-economic
conditions, specific attention needs to be paid to the
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type of entrepreneurs who move. The motivations of
the businesspeople, the incentives to relocate and the
features of the firms should be considered. This is of
great importance particularly for small- and medium-
sized enterprises, whose performance is significantly
affected by their owners’ tactics and mentality
(Greenhalg 2008). Indeed, digging into the firms and
considering their characteristics can provide valuable
insights for business tactics and add to the explanation
of relocation and its effects on business performance.
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